Corbet D\u27Entremont, Plaintiff, -against- Atlas Health Care Linen Services, Co., LLC; Scott Wakeman, sued individually and as an employee of Atlas; and Jane Doe, quality control manager for Atlas, sued individually and as agent for Atlas, Defendants by Kahn, Judge Lawrence E.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
ADAAA Case Repository Labor and Employment Law Program 
3-13-2013 
Corbet D'Entremont, Plaintiff, -against- Atlas Health Care Linen 
Services, Co., LLC; Scott Wakeman, sued individually and as an 
employee of Atlas; and Jane Doe, quality control manager for 
Atlas, sued individually and as agent for Atlas, Defendants 
Judge Lawrence E. Kahn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/adaaa 
Thank you for downloading this resource, provided by the ILR School's Labor and Employment 
Law Program. Please help support our student research fellowship program with a gift to the 
Legal Repositories! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Labor and Employment Law Program at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in ADAAA Case Repository by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Corbet D'Entremont, Plaintiff, -against- Atlas Health Care Linen Services, Co., LLC; 
Scott Wakeman, sued individually and as an employee of Atlas; and Jane Doe, 
quality control manager for Atlas, sued individually and as agent for Atlas, 
Defendants 
Keywords 
Corbet D'Entremont, Atlas Health Care Linen Services Co. LLC, Scott Wakeman, Jane Doe, 1:12-CV-0060 
(LEK/RFT), Summary Judgment, Disparate Treatment, Termination, Other physical impairment disability, 
Lifting, Healthcare, Employment Law, ADAAA 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/adaaa/195 
Case 1:12-cv-00060-LEK-RFT Document 42 Filed 03/13/13 Page 1 of 20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 




ATLAS HEALTH CARE LINEN 
SERVICES, CO., LLC; SCOTT 
WAKEMAN, sued individually and as 
as an employee of Atlas; and JANE DOE,
Quality Control Manager for Atlas, sued 




On January 12, 2012,pro se Plaintiff Corbet D’Entremont (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint 
against Defendants Atlas Health Care Linen Services, Co., LLC (“Atlas”), Scott Wakeman, and a 
single Jane Doe Defendant (“Doe” or “the Doe Defendant”) identified as a “Quality Control 
Manager for Atlas” (collectively, “Defendants”). Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). Plaintiff asserts federal 
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and § 510 of the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Id. On January 12, 2012, Plaintiff also filed a 
Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which was subsequently granted by the Honorable 
Randolph F. Treece, United States Magistrate Judge. Dkt. Nos. 2, 7.
Following a number of extension requests by Defendants, which were granted by Judge 
Treece,1 Defendants filed a Motion to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)




of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on April 30, 2012.2 Dkt. No. 25 (“Defendants’ Motion”). 
On May 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to Defendants’ Motion. Dkt. No. 31 
(“Plaintiff’s Response”). Defendants, in turn, filed a Reply on June 4, 2012. Dkt. No. 32 
(“Defendants’ Reply”).
On June 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion to amend his Complaint to name the Doe 
Defendant and “fix any deficiencies the court may find.” Dkt. No. 37 (“Plaintiff’s Motion”). On 
June 28, 2012, Defendants filed a Response in opposition. Dkt. No. 38 (“Defendants’ Response”). 
Plaintiff, in turn, filed a Reply on July 13, 2012. Dkt. No. 39 (“Plaintiff’s Reply”). Presently before 
the Court are Defendants’ Motion to dismiss and Plaintiff’s Motion to amend
II. BACKGROUND
The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with the factual allegations underlying this 
action and recites them here only to the extent necessary to resolve the instant Motions. For a more 
complete statement of the facts, reference is made to the Complaint.
On January 14, 2011, Plaintiff began work for Atlas as a laundry sorter. Compl. ^  8-9. 
Plaintiff was given papers to sign by Doe, who also informed Plaintiff that he was on a 90-day 
probation period with Atlas, after which he would be able to join the union, as well as Atlas’s 
medical, dental, and life insurance plans. Id. ^  9, 11. On his first day of work, Plaintiff worked 
from approximately 7:00 AM until 7:30 PM. Id. ^ 12. He was assigned to the “clean side” of the 
factory, where his job duties included folding clean linen and placing it into designated carts. Id. 
Following his first day of work, Plaintiff experienced no back pain. Id.
2 Defendants also move to dismiss the pendent state law claims under Rule 12(b)(1) in the 
event that the Court dismisses the federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
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The following day, after starting work on the clean side of the factory, Plaintiff was 
transferred to the “dirty side,” where his job responsibilities involved unloading dirty laundry from 
trucks, carrying crates, and sorting and lifting bags of dirty laundry. Id.. ^  16-17. By the end of the 
day, Plaintiff was experiencing slight pain in his lower back.
On January 16, 2011, Plaintiff reported for work wearing a back brace that had been 
provided to him by a physician. Id. ^ 20. Plaintiff once again worked on the dirty side of the 
factory. Id. ^  9, 11. After lunch, Plaintiff spoke with his supervisor and told his supervisor -  when 
asked -  that he preferred working on the clean side of the factory because of his back problems.3 Id. 
^ 23. The supervisor said that he would try to have Plaintiff reassigned to the clean side. Id. That 
night, Plaintiff experienced significant lower back pain. Id. ^ 26.
The following day, January 17, 2011, Plaintiff was experiencing excruciating back pain and 
went to St. Mary’s Hospital instead of reporting for work. Id. 27-29. There, he was given a 
doctor’s note “keeping him out of work for three days.” Id. ^ 30. While he had not informed Atlas 
of his absence in advance or on the day of his trip to the hospital, Plaintiff called Atlas’s “absentee 
hotline” at 12:00 A.M. on January 18, 2011, and left a message explaining the situation (including 
the existence of the doctor’s note). Id. 30-35. Plaintiff did not attend work the next day, and left 
another message on the absentee hotline explaining that he would be missing work on January 20 
for a doctor’s appointment. Id. fflf 37-38.
After meeting with his back specialist, Dr. Whalen, on January 20, 2011, Plaintiff left yet 
another message with Atlas, this time stating that Dr. Whalen was keeping him out of work for the
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3 Plaintiff also told his supervisor that he was wearing a back brace. Id. H 23.
3
next seven days and asking that someone from Atlas call him to discuss the situation.4 Id. ^ 42. On 
January 21, 2011, Plaintiff brought his doctor’s note to the Atlas building and rang the door bell, but 
no one responded.5 Id.. ^ 43. Plaintiff left another voice message explaining that he had tried to 
drop off the doctor’s note and stating that he would be out of work until January 26, 2011. Id. ^  45.
On January 26, 2011, Plaintiff finally returned to Atlas. Id. ^ 47. He gave both of his 
doctor’s notes to Doe and told her about his back injury and explained that he had called in to report 
his absences after the first day. Id. 47-49. Plaintiff told her that he had discussed the possibility 
of filing a worker’s compensation claim against Atlas with Dr. Whalen, but that they had 
determined that Plaintiff should not because his back pain was an aggravation of a previous injury. 
Id. ^ 51. At this point, Doe asked how long Plaintiff had worked for Atlas. Id. ^ 52. Plaintiff 
replied “three days,” Doe looked over Plaintiff’s doctors’ notes one more time, and told him, 
“[U]nfortunately, we let you go.” Id. fflf 53-54.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants knew he was serving a court-ordered sentence of probation 
at the time of his employment because he had stated it on his job application form. Id. ^  57-59. 
Following his firing, Plaintiff was charged with violating the terms of his probation in part due to 
his not having gainful employment. Id. Plaintiff was sentenced to three years’ incarceration and 
post release probation due to his violation. Id. ^ 60.
Plaintiff pursued state administrative remedies against Atlas for discrimination and, on 
October 17, 2011, received a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity
4 Dr. Whalen also told Plaintiff that when he returned to work, he could not lift more than 
ten pounds. Id. ^ 41.
5 From the Complaint, it is unclear whether the building Plaintiff visited on January 21, 2011 
is the same as the “factory” to which he had previously reported to work.
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Commission (“EEOC”). Id. ^  50-63. The instant suit followed.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Motion to Dismiss
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also FED . R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Such a 
determination “requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). A court must accept as true the factual allegations 
contained in the complaint and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Allaire Corp. v. 
Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2006). A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) only where it appears that there are not “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plausibility requires “enough fact[s] to raise a 
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct].” Id. at 556. 
The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[T]he pleading standard 
Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Where a court is unable to infer more than the mere possibility of the 
alleged misconduct based on the pleaded facts, the pleader has not demonstrated that he or she is 
entitled to relief and the action is subject to dismissal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Additionally, the allegations of a pro se litigant are to be construed under a “less stringent
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standard[] than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 
(1972); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).
B. Leave to Amend the Complaint
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “a party may amend its pleading 
only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave[,] . . . [but that t]he court should 
freely give leave when justice so requires.” FED . R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). “In the absence of any 
apparent or declared reason -  such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to 
the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. -  the leave 
sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 
As noted, the allegations of a pro se litigant are to be construed under a “less stringent standard[] 
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21; see also Harris, 572 F.3d at 
72. “Apro se plaintiff, particularly one bringing a civil rights action, should be afforded an 
opportunity fairly freely to amend his complaint.” Holmes v. Goldin, 615 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 
1980); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); Cuoco v. 
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (“A pro se complaint is to be read liberally. Certainly 
the court should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of 
the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”).
Additionally, “‘[t]he party opposing a motion for leave to amend has the burden of 
establishing that granting such leave would be unduly prejudicial.’” Gorham-DiMaggio v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-019, 2009 WL 1748743, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 19, 
2009) (quoting New York v. Panex Indus., Inc., No. 94-CV-0400, 1997 WL 128369, at *2
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(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997)). A district court is afforded broad discretionary power in granting leave 
to amend pleadings. Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater N.Y. v. Parker Meridien Hotel, 
145 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1998). However, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is 
unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. 
Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993). Where “futility is an appropriate basis for 
denying leave to amend, such denial should be contemplated within the standards necessary to 
withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule 12(b)(6)].” Gorham-DiMaggio, 2009 WL 
1748743, at *3.
To be granted leave to amend a complaint that names a new party, Plaintiff must name a
“new party [who must] be deemed to relate back to the original timely complaint.” VKK Corp. v.
Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2001). Further,
[t]here are . . . three requirements that must be met before an amended complaint that 
names a new party can be deemed to relate back to the original timely complaint. First, 
both complaints must arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. Second, 
the additional defendant must have been omitted from the original complaint by mistake.
Third, the additional defendant must not be prejudiced by the delay.
Id. (citing Soto v. Brooklyn Corr. Facility, 80 F.3d 34, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1996)). The goal of these
“relation back” principles outlined by the Second Circuit and drawn from Rule 15(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is “to prevent parties against whom claims are made from taking unjust
advantage of otherwise inconsequential pleading errors to sustain a limitations defense.” Advanced
Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 19 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
15 Advisory Committee Note (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also VKK Corp., 244
F.3d at 128.




As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ Motion is 
untimely. Plaintiff claims that he was unaware of any extensions granted to Defendants. A review 
of the docket, however, reveals that Judge Treece granted several requests by Defendants for 
extensions of time to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Dkt. Nos. 17, 20; Text Order dated April 20, 
2011. In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, and in the interests of preventing continued confusion, the 
Court orders the Clerk of the Court to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the docket in this matter.
Next, the Court notes that the parties have submitted supplemental materials. Where both 
parties submit supplemental materials not contained in the pleadings, and those materials are not 
excluded by the court, the motion to dismiss “must be treated as one for summary judgment under 
Rule 56.” FED . R. Ci v . P. 12(d); see also Rotter v. Leahy, 93 F. Supp. 2d 487, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
The Court declines to consider these supplemental materials and therefore treats Defendants’
Motion as a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court addresses Defendants’ arguments in turn, 
addressing the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings.
1. ADA Claim
Before addressing the broader claim against Atlas, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s ADA 
claim against Defendant Wakeman suffers from a fatal flaw. A defendant may not be held 
individually liable under Title I of the ADA. See, e.g., Carlson v. Geneva City Sch. Dist., 679 F. 
Supp. 2d 355, 378 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that actions against defendants in their individual 
capacities are not permitted under Title I of the ADA); Fox v. State Univ. of N.Y., 497 F. Supp. 2d 
446, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (same) (citing Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d
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98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001). Because this is a legal defect in Plaintiff’s claim that could not be remedied 
by better pleadings, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s ADA claim against Defendant Wakeman with 
prejudice.6 Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
“The ADA prohibits discrimination against a ‘qualified individual on the basis of disability’ 
in the ‘terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.’” Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 
151, 155 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). To establish aprima facie case of 
discriminatory discharge under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) her employer is subject to 
the ADA; (2) she suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (3) she could perform 
the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) she was fired 
because of her disability.” Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 869-70 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(citing Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1994); Bates v. Long Island R.R., 
997 F.2d 1028, 1035 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Courts analyzing discrimination claims under the ADA apply the three-step burden-shifting 
approach articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1972); McBride v. BIC Consumer Products Mfg. Co., Inc., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2006) At 
the first stage, the burden of production rests with the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); Bickerstaff v. Vassar 
Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 446 (2d Cir. 1999). This initial burden is not a heavy one. See Abdu-Brisson 
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001); Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital 
Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 2001). After the plaintiff has made a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the defendant to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its action.
6 For the same reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s ADA claim against Defendant Jane 
Doe with prejudice.
Case 1:12-cv-00060-LEK-RFT Document 42 Filed 03/13/13 Page 9 of 20
9
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792 at 802. If the defendant is able to make such a showing, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “produce evidence and carry the burden of persuasion that the 
proffered reason is a pretext.” McBride, 583 F.3d at 96.
To survive a motion to dismiss, however, “a complaint in an employment discrimination 
lawsuit [need] not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the 
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
508 (2002); see also Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2008); Barbosa v. Continuum 
Health Partners, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). “[T]he McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework ‘is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” Boykin, 521 
F.3d at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted). The elements of a prima facie case do, however, 
“provide an outline of what is necessary to render [a plaintiff’s employment discrimination] claims 
for relief plausible.” Sommersett v. City of New York, No. 09 Civ. 5916, 2011 WL 2565301, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2011). Courts therefore “consider these elements in determining whether there 
is sufficient factual matter in the complaint which, if true, gives Defendant a fair notice of Plaintiff’s 
claim and the grounds on which it rests.” Murphy v. Suffolk Cnty. Cmty. Coll., No. 10 Civ. 0251, 
2011 WL 5976082, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011).
The ADA defines a disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1). For an individual to be “regarded as having an impairment” under 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1)(C), the individual must establish “that he or she has been subjected to an action 
prohibited under this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether
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or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” Id. § 12102(3)(A). 
However, paragraph (1)(C) “shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor. A 
transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”7 Id. 
§ 12102(3)(B).
Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), effective January 1, 
2009, which expanded the class of individuals entitled to protection under the ADA.8 “Following 
the amendments, major life activities no longer need to be of ‘central importance,’ and may include 
‘caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, 
lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and 
working.’” Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Group, Ltd., No. 11-CV-4938, 2012 WL 2244325, at *6 
(E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he has back problems and that Atlas terminated his 
employment as a result of his health issues. See generally Compl. 64-70. Liberally construed, 
his Complaint alleges that: (1) Atlas is subject to the regulations of the ADA; (2) Plaintiff was 
physically able to perform the job duties associated with the clean side of the Atlas factory; (3)
7 See also Kennebrew v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 01 CIV 1654, 2002 WL 265120, at *18 
n.32 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2002) (“[T]emporary, non-chronic impairments of short-duration, with little 
or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities.”).
8 The Ninth Circuit has stated that:
In the ADAAA, Congress emphasizes that when it enacted the ADA in 1990, it 
“intended that the Act ‘provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities’ and provide broad 
coverage.” The ADAAA rejects the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term 
“disability” in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), and thereby expands 
the class of individuals who are entitled to protection under the ADA.
Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citations omitted).
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Plaintiff suffered from a chronic back problem that was aggravated by the heavy lifting he had to 
perform on the dirty side of the Atlas factory; (4) Atlas found out about this disability through his 
phone messages and ultimately through his doctors’ notes; and (5) Doe ultimately fired him because 
he was disabled. See generally id.
Defendants contend, however, that Plaintiff’s ADA claim is deficient because: (1) Plaintiff 
has failed to allege that he was disabled under the language of the ADA; (2) Plaintiff has made no 
assertion that Atlas provided preferential treatment to non-disabled employees; and (3) Atlas had no 
notice of Plaintiff’s alleged disability. See generally Def.’s Mot. at 6-10. Defendants’ argument is 
essentially that Plaintiff was fired immediately upon his failure to report to work on January 17, 
2011, for violating the attendance policy for probationary employees and that -  even if Plaintiff’s 
back injury amounted to a disability, and even if Defendants were eventually placed on notice -  
Defendants were not on notice of the disability until January 18, 2011. See generally id.
Mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status and of the Second Circuit’s admonition that a plaintiff’s 
burden of establishing aprima facie case at the initial McDonnell Douglas pleading stage “is neither 
onerous nor intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic,” Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), the Court denies 
Defendants’ Motion to dismiss as to the ADA claim. Plaintiff’s prima facie case may be lacking in 
great detail as to the specifics of his disability, his description of his ability to perform the essential 
functions of his job may be sparse, and his recitation of causation may not be unassailable, but the 
Court concludes that his pleadings “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 570. Further, given Plaintiff’s detailed account of his brief employment, his interaction 
with physicians, and his ultimate encounter with Doe, the Court concludes that the Complaint
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provides Defendants with sufficient notice as to the nature of the claim.
2. ERISA Claim
As pleaded, Plaintiff’s ERISA claim, even liberally construed, may not go forward. In his 
Complaint, Plaintiff states his claim under § 510 of ERISA. Section 510 provides in pertinent part 
that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or 
discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is 
entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan . . . or for the purpose of 
interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become 
entitled under the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1140; Sandberg v. KPMG Peat Marwick, L.L.P., 111 F.3d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1997). 
“Section 510 was designed primarily to prevent unscrupulous employers from discharging or 
harassing their employees in order to keep them from obtaining vested pension rights.” Dister v. 
Cont’l Grp., Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. 
v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990) (“By its terms § 510 protects plan participants from 
termination motivated by an employer’s desire to prevent a pension from vesting.”). “There is, 
however, no cause of action under section 510 where the loss of pension benefits ‘was a mere 
consequence of, but not a motivating factor behind, a termination of employment.’” Lightfoot v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 906 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Dister, 859 F.2d at 1111).
Plaintiff has failed to allege that an applicable plan exists or that he was covered under such 
a plan in such a way as to trigger protections under ERISA. Further, Plaintiff’s Response to 
Defendants’ Motion simply makes vague references to a claim that was submitted to an insurance 
company that he is trying to locate and contains no argument affirmatively identifying himself as a 
harmed beneficiary. Therefore, Plaintiff’s ERISA claim is dismissed. However, in light of
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Plaintiff’s pro se status and absent any reason to conclude that Defendants would be prejudiced by 
amendment, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend this claim.
3. The State Law Claims
So long as a district court’s original jurisdiction was not founded solely on diversity of 
citizenship, “district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so 
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case 
or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district court may retain pendent jurisdiction over state 
law claims whenever the state law claim(s) and the federal claim(s) (through which original subject 
matter jurisdiction was obtained), “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
“Pendent jurisdiction is ‘a doctrine of discretion’ for the district court.” Raucci v. Town of 
Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1054 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726). “[T]he doctrine 
of pendent jurisdiction thus is a doctrine of flexibility, designed to allow courts to deal with cases 
involving pendent claims in the manner that most sensibly accommodates a range of concerns and 
values.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
In the instant case, the Court concludes that all of the claims alleged arise from a “common 
nucleus of operative fact” -  Plaintiff’s discharge from Atlas. Because the Court has found that at 
least one federal claim survives Defendants’ Motion to dismiss, and absent any other showing of 
prejudice or argument as to why it would be imprudent for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff’s state law claims, the Court exercises its discretion to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 
state law claims.
a. Breach of Contract
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Under New York law, “an action for breach of contract requires proof of (1) a contract; (2) 
performance of the contract by one party; (3) breach by the other party; and (4) damages.” First 
Investors Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1998). “[A]bsent an agreement 
establishing a fixed duration, an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, 
terminable at any time by any party.” Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333 (1987); 
accord DePetris v. Union Settlement Ass’n, Inc., 86 N.Y.2d 406, 410 (1995).
“[A]n employer’s virtually unfettered power to terminate an at-will employee does not 
negate its duty to abide by promises made prior to termination.” Parker v. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 339 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Leonelli v. Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d 1195, 1196 
(2d Cir. 1989)). However,
[t]o sustain a cause of action for breach of an employment contract, a discharged 
employee must show that the employee handbook, or some other enforceable 
employment contract, contained an express limitation prohibiting the employee’s 
discharge except for cause, and that the employee specifically relied upon this language.
Howley v. Newsday, Inc., 627 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86 (App. Div. 1995). “The complaint [in a breach of
contract case] ‘must, at a minimum, allege the terms of the contract, each element of the alleged
breach and the resultant damages in a plain and simple fashion.’” Power Travel Int’l., Inc. v.
American Airlines, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 701, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Zaro Licensing, Inc. v.
Cinmar, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 276, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
In this case, Plaintiff states that he reached an oral, or at the very least, an implied agreement
with Atlas that if he worked for 90 days as a probationary employee he would receive “certain
privalages [sic] offered by the company.” Pl.’s Resp. at 13. Construed liberally, this is clearly a
conditional agreement -  if Plaintiff were to perform one task (satisfactorily perform his job duties
for 90 days), then Atlas would confer certain benefits. However, Plaintiff contends that by
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unlawfully firing him before he worked for 90 days, Atlas breached its contract. The Court 
concludes that -  to the extent Plaintiff had an oral or implied contract -  he has misidentified the 
contract as one for a 90-day term of employment. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing 
all inferences in his favor, the Court concludes that Plaintiff did not have a contract for a 90-day 
term of employment; rather, he had been guaranteed benefits i f  he worked for 90 days. Because 
Plaintiff has failed to allege (1) the existence of a contract, (2) performance, and (3) breach, the 
Court grants Defendants’ Motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Further, the Court 
concludes that this claim is deficient as a matter of law and could not be remedied by better 
pleading; therefore, the Court dismisses this claim with prejudice and does not grant Plaintiff leave 
to amend. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
b. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
“New York law . . . does not recognize a separate cause of action for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing when a breach of contract claim, based upon the same facts, 
is also pled.” Harris v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2002). 
Therefore, a claim alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “can 
survive a motion to dismiss ‘only if it is based on allegations different than those underlying the 
accompanying breach of contract claim.’” ARI & Co. v. Regent Int’l Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 518, 
522 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Siradas v. Chase Lincoln First Bank, N.A., No. 98 Civ. 4028, 1999 
WL 787658, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999)).
In this case, Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is based on identical factual allegations to the ones underlying the breach of contract claim. 
Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to dismiss this claim. Further, even granting
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Plaintiff’s Complaint a liberal reading, the Court concludes that this claim in Plaintiff’s case is 
inherently duplicative of his claim for breach of contract. Therefore, because the deficiency here is 
one of law and not based on a pleading error, the Court dismisses this claim with prejudice and does 
not grant Plaintiff leave to amend. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
c. Defamation
The elements of a defamation claim in New York are “a false statement, published [by the 
defendant] without privilege or authorization to a third party, constituting fault as judged by, at a 
minimum, a negligence standard, and, it must either cause special harm [to] or constitute defamation 
per se [of the plaintiff].” Feldman v. Edwab, No. 1:10-CV-0261, 2011 WL 1298717, at *5 
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011) (Kahn, J.) (quoting Dillon v. City of New York, 704 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (App. 
Div. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord O’Neill v. N.Y.U., 944 N.Y.S.2d 503, 513 
(App. Div. 2012).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that statements made by Defendants Doe and Wakeman were 
defamatory under New York law. Compl. ^ 85. However, even under a liberal reading of his 
Complaint, Plaintiff fails to specify what statements were allegedly defamatory or to flesh out this 
claim with anything other conclusory allegations that the statements were made with malice. Id. 
Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation claim. In an 
abundance of caution and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to 
amend this claim.
d  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
In order to state a claim for IIED in New York, a plaintiff must show: “(1) extreme and 
outrageous conduct; (2) intent to cause, or reckless disregard of a substantial probability of causing,
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severe emotional distress; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) severe 
emotional distress.” Stuto v. Fleishman, 164 F.3d 820, 827 (2d Cir. 1999). The standard for 
stating a valid claim is “rigorous, and difficult to satisfy” because the conduct must be “so 
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, 
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Howell v. N.Y. 
Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 122 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, IIED 
is a “highly disfavored claim[ ] under New York law.” Williams v. City of Mount Vernon, 428 F. 
Supp. 2d 146, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Seltzer 
v. Bayer, 709 N.Y.S.2d 21, 23 (App. Div. 2000) (“This threshold of outrageousness is so difficult to 
reach that, of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims considered by the Court of 
Appeals, every one has failed because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently outrageous.” (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
As with Plaintiff’s defamation claim, Plaintiff’s IIED claim -  even when granted a liberal 
reading -  consists only of a number of conclusory statements and a recitation of the generic 
elements of an IIED claim. Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to dismiss the IIED 
claim. In an abundance of caution and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff 
leave to amend this claim.
e. Civil Conspiracy
The basis for this claim is unclear. In his Response to Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff cites 
Georgia state case law as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Pl.’s Resp. at 14-15. Further, the 
Court is unable to discern what tortious acts might serve as the predicates for this claim. Even 
construing Plaintiff’s Complaint and submissions with the utmost liberality, both the legal and
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factual bases for this claim are unclear. Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to dismiss 
the civil conspiracy claim. However, in an abundance of caution and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se 
status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend this claim.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion
Because the court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint consistent with the terms of 
this Memorandum-Decision and Order, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to amend as moot.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. No. 25) to dismiss is GRANTED in part and 
DENIED in part consistent with this Memorandum-Decision and Order; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. No. 25) to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claims 
against all Defendants other than Defendant Wakeman is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED in part in accordance 
with this Memorandum-Decision and Order such that: (1) Plaintiff’s ADA claim against Defendant 
Wakeman is DISMISSED with prejudice; (2) Plaintiff’s ADA claim against Defendant Jane Doe 
is DISMISSED with prejudice; (2) Plaintiff’s ERISA claim is DISMISSED without prejudice; 
(3) Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing are DISMISSED with prejudice; and (4) Plaintiff’s claims for defamation, IIED, and civil 
conspiracy are DISMISSED without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion (Dkt. No. 37) is DENIED as moot; and it is further 
ORDERED, that if Plaintiff wishes to amend his Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) and proceed with 
this action, he must do so within thirty (30) days from the date of filing of this Memorandum-
Case 1:12-cv-00060-LEK-RFT Document 42 Filed 03/13/13 Page 19 of 20
19
Decision and Order. If Plaintiff does not comply with this Memorandum-Decision and Order and 
file an amended complaint in a timely fashion, however, the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) will remain the 
operative pleading and only those claims not dismissed by this Memorandum-Decision and Order 
will remain; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on all
parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 13, 2013
Albany, New York
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